ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT
OF CASE
THIS
MATTER is an appeal by the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles
(“Department”) from a Final Order and Decision of the South Carolina Office of
Motor Vehicle Hearings (“OMVH”). The OMVH’s Final Order and Decision was
issued following an administrative hearing held pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §
56-9-363 (Supp. 2007) of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act of
South Carolina. The Department asserts that rescission of a driver’s license
suspension pursuant to section 56-9-363 requires proof of evidence commensurate
with the criteria set forth in section 56-9-352(7). The Administrative Law
Court (“ALC” or “Court”) has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2007) and pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §
56-9-363 (Supp. 2007). Upon consideration of the briefs, the OMVH’s Final
Order and Decision is affirmed.
FACTS
On February 25, 2008, Respondent was traveling along highway
521 through the intersection of Meeting Street in Lancaster, SC when another
vehicle entered from East Meeting Street and hit Respondent on the passenger
side. On April 16, 2008, the Department issued a Notice of Financial
Responsibility Accident Suspension, Form FR5, informing Respondent of his
impending driver’s license suspension on May 16, 2008, subject to proof of liability
insurance or a hearing to show proof that there is no reasonable possibility of
an adverse judgment. Through the assistance of counsel, Respondent requested a
hearing pursuant to section 56-9-363 that was scheduled for June 4, 2008.
Prior to the hearing, the Department mailed to the DMVH
certified copies of the traffic collision report, the FR-10 form received from
Respondent’s liability insurance carrier and the FR-5 form Notice of Financial
Responsibility Accident Suspension. The accompanying letter that was filed
with the OMVH on May, 27, 2008, requested that these documents be entered into
the record for Respondent’s hearing.
The OMVH hearing was held as scheduled on June 4, 2008, with
Respondent, Respondent’s attorney and the DHO in attendance. Respondent
stated for the record that he was driving with his trailer in tow on highway
521 headed toward Kershaw. The OMVH hearing officer asked what color the
traffic signal indicated when Respondent entered the intersection, and Respondent
stated that it was green. Respondent emphasized that he did not have any doubt
regarding the traffic signal. Respondent also stated that it was his trailer
that was struck and that the other vehicle entered highway 521 from Meeting Street on Respondent’s passenger side. Respondent noted that although he was
ticketed for ‘driving too fast for conditions’, he was not cited for running a
red light. Before the hearing concluded, Respondent’s objected to the traffic
report being entered into the record based upon the statutory safeguards of
section 56-5-1290 and based on upon the fact that the Department was
unavailable for cross-examination.
On June 9, 2008, the DHO issued a Final Order and
Decision rescinding the driver’s license suspension of Respondent based upon
the finding that no reasonable possibility exists that a civil court might
enter a judgment against Respondent as a result of the accident in question. The
DHO found Respondent to be a credible witness and indicated that the evidence entered
by the Department was unreliable and contradictory. The DHO concluded that
Respondent’s testimony was more accurate as weighed against the confusing
evidence relied upon by the Department. The Department now appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
OMVH is authorized by law to determine contested cases arising from the
Department. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2007). Therefore, the
OMVH is an “agency” under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (2005). As such, the APA’s standard of review
governs appeals from decisions of the OMVH. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A) (Supp. 2007); see also Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health & Human
Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 319 S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1995). The
standard used by appellate bodies, including the ALC, to review agency
decisions is provided by S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2007). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2007) (directing Administrative Law Judges
to conduct appellate review in the same manner prescribed in Section
1-23-380(A)). This section provides:
The court may not substitute its judgment
for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for
further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the
agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation
of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of
the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful
procedure;
(d) affected by other
error of law;
(e) clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or
capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion.
S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2007).
A
decision is supported by “substantial evidence” when the record as a whole
allows reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion reached by the agency. Bilton
v. Best Western Royal Motor Lodge, 282 S.C. 634, 641, 321 S.E.2d 63, 68
(Ct. App. 1984). A decision will not be set aside simply because reasonable
minds may differ on the judgment. Lark, 276 S.C. at 136, 276 S.E.2d
304, 307. The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the
possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent the agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters
v. S.C. Land Resources Conservation Comm’n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d
913, 917 (1996); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 353, 461
S.E.2d 388, 391 (1995).
In
applying the substantial evidence rule, the factual findings of the
administrative agency are presumed to be correct. Rodney v. Michelin Tire
Co., 320 S.C. 515, 519, 466 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996) (citing Kearse
v. State Health and Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 318 S.C. 198, 200, 456 S.E.2d
892, 893 (1995)). The party challenging an agency action has the burden of
proving convincingly that the agency’s decision is unsupported by substantial
evidence. Waters, 321 S.C. at 226, 467 S.E.2d at 917.
ISSUE
ON APPEAL
1. Did the hearing officer err when he found that no reasonable possibility
exists that a civil court might enter a judgment against Respondent as a result
of the accident in question?
The
Department contends that section 56-9-352 (7) sets forth the evidence that
Respondent was required to show in order to meet his burden of proof under
section 56-9-363, that “no reasonable possibility exists that a civil court
might enter a judgment against him as a result of the accident in question.” See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-9-352, 363 (2005), infra.
The
Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility statutes governing liability coverage
were enacted by the legislature to induce the purchase of insurance and to
protect highway victims. Evans v. American Home Assur. Co., 252 S.C.
417, 166 S.E.2d 811 (1969). Following a motor vehicle accident, a driver’s
license is subject to suspension as set forth in section 56-9-351, which
states, in part, the following:
Within sixty
days of receipt of a report of a motor vehicle accident within this State which
has resulted in bodily injury or death or damage to the property of any one
person in the amount of two hundred dollars or more, the Department of Motor
Vehicles shall suspend the license of each operator or driver if he is
the owner of the motor vehicle involved in the accident and all registrations
of each owner of a motor vehicle involved in the accident.
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-9-351 (2005)
(italics added).
Section
56-9-352 provides, however, nine (9) exceptions that would excuse a driver’s
license from being suspended pursuant to section 56-9-351. Section 56-9-352
states, in part, the following:
§ 56-9-352 Exceptions.
§ 56-9-351 shall not apply to any of
the following.
…
(7)
If, before the date that the Department would otherwise suspend the license and
registration or nonresident's operating privilege under § 56-9-351, there shall
be filed with the Department evidence satisfactory to it that the person who
would otherwise have to file security (a) has been released from liability, (b)
has been finally adjudicated not to be liable, (c) has executed a warrant for
confession of judgment, payable when and in such installments as the parties
have agreed to or (d) has executed a duly acknowledged written agreement,
providing for the payment of an agreed amount in installments, with respect to
all claims for injuries or damages resulting from the accidents;(8)
The owner of any legally parked vehicle when struck by another vehicle;(9)
Any person operating a motor vehicle owned by his employer while he is
operating the vehicle in the scope of his employment.
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-9-352
(2006).
Alternatively, section 56-9-363 grants a motorist, whose license is suspended
under section 56-9-351, the right to request a hearing. Specifically, section
56-9-363 provides, in part, the following:
Any person
whose driving privilege becomes subject to suspension or is suspended under
the provisions of this article may request an administrative hearing with the
Division of Motor Vehicle Hearings prior to the suspension or within thirty
days after written notice of the suspension in order that he might prove that
no reasonable possibility exists that a civil court might enter a judgment
against him as a result of the accident in question. Any person aggrieved
by the decision of the hearing officer following the hearing may file an appeal
with the Administrative Law Court in accordance with its appellate rules.
S.C. Code Ann. §
56-9-363 (2005).
In
OMVH hearings that are held pursuant to section 56-9-363, the Department has
the burden of proof to present evidence that a vehicle owned by the motorist
was involved in an accident in South Carolina resulting in bodily injury, death
or property damage to any one person in the amount of $200 or more. See SCDMV v. Russell Patrick Bradley, 06-ALJ-21-0613-AP (S.C. Admin.
Law Ct. October 8, 2007). After the Department presents prima facie evidence
meeting the criteria of a driver’s license suspension pursuant to section
56-9-351, the burden shifts to the motorist to:
(1) present
evidence to rebut the Department’s prima facie case;
(2) present
evidence to show the applicability of one of the exceptions set forth in
section 56-9-352;
or
(3) prove
that no reasonable possibility exits that that a civil court might enter a
judgment against him as a result of the accident in question.
Bradley at 7.
On
May 27, 2008, the Department met its burden of proof by submitting certified
copies of Respondent’s Traffic Collision Report Form (Form TR-310) for
introduction into the record at the financial responsibility hearing.
The Traffic Report that is contained in the record indicates the Respondent is
the owner of the motor vehicle that was involved in a South Carolina accident
in which several thousand dollars in damages were sustained. See Bradley (Notice of Suspension does not establish that the owner of a motor vehicle was
involved in an accident in South Carolina resulting in bodily injury, death or property
damage to any one person in the amount of $200 or more.). At the hearing, Respondent
stated for the record, without objection, that the traffic signal on highway
521 was green. Furthermore, the DHO indicates in the Final Order and Decision
that the Traffic Collision Report contained contradictory and confusing
evidence. Consequently, the DHO found Respondent’s statements more reliable
than the evidence presented by the Department and concluded that no reasonable
possibility existed for a judgment.
Based
upon the evidence presented by the Department and Respondent’s statements at
the OMVH hearing, there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the
hearing officer. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that the rights
of the Department have been prejudiced by conclusions that are in violation of the
statutory provisions or in excess of the statutory authority.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that the Order of the DHO is AFFIRMED and the
reinstatement of Respondent’s driving and registration privileges are upheld.
_______________________________
January 9, 2009 John D. McLeod, Judge
Columbia, SC S.C.
Administrative Law Court
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